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I. Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of territorial competition in the automotive paint and equipment supply 
business, which is the industv supplying autobody repair shops. Appellant Wesco expanded into 
the Eastern Idaho (Twin Falls, Pocatello, Idaho Falls) market by purchasing lhree stores. 
Automotive Paint Warehouse ("APW") had long bken the wholesale supplier for those stores and 
APW abruptly lost the market areato Wesco. APW's owners, Ernest and Davis, used their existing 
Idaho corporation, Paint & Spray Supply, Inc. ("P&Sn), which already owned stores in the Boise 
area, to open new stores in Eastern Idaho in an attempt to keep at least a part of the market. 
What made this territorial competition out of the ordinary was the surprising decision by 
almost all of Wesco's new employees to quit and go to work for P&S. The issue is why these 
employees were willing to switch to P&S, and more importantly whether any of the employees did 
anything legally inappropriate in making that syitch. 
B. Course ofproceedings Below 
The Defendants' original motion for summaryjudgmentwas heard on July 10,2006. 
Partial summary judgment was entered on September 6,2006 dismissing four of the original ten 
counts' and completely dismissing three defendants2 Wesco twice moved for reconsideration, once 
'Interference with Contract (Count El), Tortious Interference (Count IV), Violation of 
Unfair Competition Act (Count VI), and Civil Conspiracy (Count IX). 
2Automotive Parts Warehouse, Inc. (APW), Holly Ernest and Tom Davis (owners of 
APW and Paint & Spray Supply, Inc. (P&S). 
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with Judge Smith and once from Judge Harding. Both judges reaffirmed the summary judgment 
against Wesco. Recently Wesco dismissed thirteen of the employee defendants with prejudice, 
leaving only four of the original nineteen defendants. The result of the summary judgmen,t and the . 
recent dismissal of most of the employees, leaves the current status of the Amended Complaint as: 
-Dismissed entirely: 
Count I11 (Interference with Contract), 
Count IV: (Tortious Interference) 
Count VI: (Violation of Unfair Competition Act) 
Count IX: (Civil Conspiracy) 
-Dismissed as to Ernest, Davis, P&S, APW, and Hugh Barkdull, leaving Brady 
Barkdull and Mike Cook: 
Count I: Interference with prospective economic advantage, and 
Count 11: Breach of duty of loyalty. 
-Dismissed as to Ernest, Davis, APW, but leaving P&S, Brady Barkdull, 
Hugh Barkdull, and Mike Cook: 
Count V: Unfair competition. 
-Dismissed as to all defendants, except Mike Cook: 
Count VII (Computer Fraud Act) 
Count VIII (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets) 
Count X (Conversion) 
Shortly before the case was to be tried, Wesco made a motion for certification of a final judgment. 
Transcript, March 5,2008, p. 1. Wesco, in making that motion acknowledged that it only had a 
"very little case" left because the "very large issues" had all been resolved against Wesco. 
Transcript, March 5,2008, p. 1 1. The court then granted the motion for the appeal, on the basis that 
the summary judgment ruling dealt with "the major part of this case" and that guidance is necessary 
from the Supreme Court in order to prevent thii case having to be tried twice. Transcript, March 
5,2008, p. 15-1 6. The defendants' attorney then requested permission to file a renewed motion for 
complete summary judgment on the new evidence obtained since the partial summary judgment in 
2006, and the court granted permission for an attempt at a complete summary judgment. 
The remaining defendants then filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, relying on 
a much, more complete record than the court had in 2006, which included numerous remaining 
depositions and additional affidavits. The court denied the renewed motion for complete summary 
judgment. R. Vol. VII, p. 1274- 1446 (Vol. VIII). The denial ofthis renewed motion forms the basis 
of the Cross-Appeal. 
C. concise Statement of Facts. 
The following chronology of facts are undisputed: 
Julv: On a Friday morning a fax was sent to the employees of the three Idaho stores 
Wesco had just purchased. The fax informed the employees that their stores have been bought and 
informed them that they now worked for Wesco. This was the first time the employees heard the 
stores had been purchased by Wesco. R. Vol. IV, p. 602,605 (Peck, 12:6-25,21: 8-22:ll); R. Vol. 
IV, p. 639 (Johnston, 11: 11-14:7); R. Vol. IV, p. 657 (Dayley, 20:3-23). 
Aumst 9-12: Ernest and Davis learned that Wesco was not going to continue supplying The 
Eastern Idaho stores with paint from APW, and that Wesco would instead supply paint from its own 
sources. Ernest and Davis decided to open new stores in Eastern Idaho, so that APW could 
continue to supply paint to Eastern Idaho. Ernest and Davis already knew most of the customers in 
the area and had a good reputation. They decided to recrnit Wesco's employees, thinking some of 
the employees wouldrather continue to be affiliated withthem, and with APW, and would be willing 
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to quit the new comer, Wesco. R. Vol. 111, p. 460, (Davis, 20:18- 22:7); R. Vol. 111, p. 434-435 
(Ernest, 17:18-18:15). 
August 11-17 : Ernest began recruiting Brady Barkdull and offered him a job at the new 
stores and told him he wanted him to start on August 22. Barkdull said he would think about it. 
Barkdull and Ernest met and talked by telephone several times over a period of days while Ernest 
attempted to persuade Barkdull to make the switch. Barkdull wanted to know what the other 
employees were going to do before he made up his mind. Ernest did not ask Barkdull to help recruit 
other employees. R. Vol. 111, p. 578 (Barkdull, par. 2-6); R. Vol. 111, p. 474, (Barkdull, 87:17); R. 
Vol. 111, p. 437-442 (Ernest, 20:3 - 25:22, esp. 21:3-9). When Barkdull first discusses the possible 
job switch with other employees, it is after the other employees have already made up their minds 
to quit. R. Vol. W. pp. 615 (Cristobal, 18: 11-13). During this time Barkdull leaves all of the 
recruiting up to Ernest and Davis. Not a single employee attributes their recruitment to Barkdull. 
Aumst 17 (Wed): Ernest met with Hugh Barkduil in Preston and offered him a job. R. Vol. 
111, p. 430 (Ernest, 13:l-10). Ernest later met with Mike Cook in Pocatello and offered him a job. 
R. Vol. M, p. 489 (Cook, 50:25-52:21). That evening Ernest met with Jenny Hancock and offered 
her a job. Barkdull was present, but Hancock's testimony is very clear that Ernest made the job offer 
and that her decision to leave was not based on pressure from Barkdull. She has specifically denied 
that Brady recruited her. R. Vol. V, p. 879; R. Vol. 111, p. 494 (Hancock, 22:14-17,23:8-14). 
August 18 (Thur): Ernest met in the evening with the Twin Falls managers and salesmen, 
including Travis Dayley, David Cristobal, Jeff Peck and Joel Johnston. He first took Cristobal, 
Johnston, and Dayley out to dinner and offered them jobs. R. Vol. IV, pp. 614 (Cristobal, 16: 5- 
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17:25). Barkdull was not at the meeting, and the employees did not discuss their decision with 
Barkdull until after they hadmade up their minds to quit. R. Vol. IV. pp. 615 (Cristobal, l8:11-13). 
The employees were curious if other employees were also being recruited and Ernest refused to tell 
them ifthis was his plan. R. Vol. IV, p. 642 (Johnston, 23:2-24:13). Ernest made it clear that he was 
going to open the new store in Twin Falls, with or without them, on Monday morning. R. Vol. IV, 
p. 643 (Johnston, 25:6-8). After dinner the employees discussed their plans and decided that the 
three of them would go to work for P&S, specifically because they were more comfortable working 
with Ernest, whom they already knew, than with Wesco, for whom they had some mistrust as to their 
job security. R. Vol. IV, p. 643 (Johnston, 26:15-25); R. Vol. IV, pp. 615 (Cristobal, 18:24-19:6). 
Ernest and Davis then met separately with Peck in Twin Falls and offered him a job. Peck 
told Ernest and Davis he wanted to sleep on it, but called Ernest the next morning at 7:30 a.m. and 
accepted the offer. Barkdull was not involved in this, and Peck did not discuss his decision with 
Barkdull until after Peck had made up his mind. The first time Peck heard about the job opporhmity 
was on the from Ernest. Peck credits Ernest and Davis entirely with his recruitment. R. Vol. 
IV, pp. 674-675,679 (Peck, 32:16-34:24,50:1-12). 
Sometime later that night, the Twin Falls delivery girl, Chantil Dobbs learns that Dayley, 
Cristobal and Johnston have decided to resign and go to work for Wesco. She decides to quit as she 
doesn't want to be the only one left at the store. R. Vol. IV, p. 652-653 (Dobbs, 12:7-14:3) 
In Idaho Falls, Hancock tells two other employees, Thompson and McClure (counter help 
and delivery) about her decision to leave Wesco and go to work for P&S. They decide to quit too, 
although McClure does not actually quit until a week later when she is back from her vacation. 
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August 19 (Friday): In Pocatello Mike Cook speaks with Reid, Stairs, and Thomson (counter 
help and delivery) about his decision to quit and go to work for P&S. They decide to quit. This is 
the first day any of the other Pocatello employees had heard of P&S opening new stores. Brady 
Barkdull was not part of this conversation. R. Vol. IV, p. 505 (Reid, 6:8-7:9). On this same day 
Cook finds aresignation form on the internet, andmentions it to other employees, who decide to use 
the same fonn, rather than write their own. R. Vol. VII, par. 11. Jenny Hancock drafted her own 
resignation letter and at least one of the other employees decided to use the same letter. From all 
three stores resignations are sent by facsimile to Wesco between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., which is 
between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. in Washington. This is the same manner in which the employees had 
been idoimed, on July 29, around 5:00 p.m., that the stores had been bought. 
Aumst 19-29: The employees start work at P&S at varying times between 7:00 p.m. on 
Friday, August 19 and Monday August 29. The employees went to work for P&S at the same pay 
rate they had been receiving at Wesco. R. Vol. 111, p. 492 (I3ancock, 7:7-15). 
Auaust 22 (Monday): The new P&S stores opened for business in Twin Falls and Pocatello. 
The Idaho Falls store is not opened until some time later. The salesmen, along with Ernest and 
Davis, and other employees 60m Utah, begin contacting customers and delivering letters. R. Vol. 
V, p. 903-904 (Hansen Affidavit, par. 7-9.) 
By Monday August22 Wesco has organized aresponse tp P&SYs new stores and uses a sales 
force of Wesco employees and factory representatives to begin making calls on all of the autobody 
paint shops in Eastern Idaho. They contact virtually all customers by Wednesday, August 25. R. 
Vol. VII, p. 1237 (Evans, 635-64:4). 
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11. Additional Issues Presented on Appeal 
5. Whether the District Court erred by failing to grant theDefendant's Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment, granting a full and final judgment dismissing the entire case. 
III. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." IRCP 56(c). Baxter v Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). 
Although the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
rests with the moving party, once that burden has been met, the burden shifts to the non-moving 
party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School District #2, 128 Idaho 714,918 P.2d 583 (1996); Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 
867 P.2d 960 (1994). Importantly, the non-moving party may not simply rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue of fact to be resolved at trial. IRCP 56(e), Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho at 170; Smith 
v. Meridian Joint School District #2, 128 Idaho at 719. If there is an absence of evidence on a 
dispositive issue for which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, that party must "go 
beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,324-25,106 S.Ct. 2548,91 L.Ed.2d265 (1986). Surnmaryjudgment 
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is mandated against the nonmoving party who thereafter fails to present sufficient evidence to 
establish a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. at 322, 324-25 
Further, a non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more solid than 
speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Edwards 
v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 853,727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App.1986). "There is no issue 
for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict 
for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 
judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). 
IV. Argument 
A. Introduction 
Wesco begins its argument at page 13 of Appellant's Brief by stating that "had the Wesco 
employees simply decided to quit of their own accord, Wesco would have no complaint." Wesco 
continues, "Had Ernest, Davis, and P&S directly recruited Wesco employees and persuaded them, 
through higher pay, promotions, or other inducements, to quit Wesco and become P&S employees, 
Wesco would have no Complaint." This is afair assessment of the law. More importantly, it is also 
a fair assessment of the facts: (1) The employees did decide to quit of their own accord, each for his 
or her own reasons; and (2) Ernest and Davis, on behalf of P&S, did all of the recruiting of Wesco's 
key employees (managers and sales people) without any help from Barkdull. In deed, Ernest and 
Davis successfully recruited the key employees, not because of offering higher pay, or promotions, 
but because of having already having earned the key employee's trust through APW, especially when 
compared to the distrust created by Wesco in the three weeks the employees worked for Wesco. 
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The main factual issue in the case is found within Wesco's next statement: "The central fact 
is that Barkdull, at the behest of Ernest, Davis, and P&S, solicited all of Wesco's Idaho managers 
and nearly its entire workforce to abruptly quit en rnasse and join P&S in direct competition with 
Wesco." This bold statement is exactly the required fact that is entirely absent from the record, and 
it is this absence that justifies this court granting full summary judgment against Wesco. There is 
no evidence whatsoever that Barkdull solicited even a single employee to quit and work for P&S. 
Rather, there is an abundance of positive evidence as to how each employee was recruited. There 
is no question that the recruitment of the managers and sales people was done entirely by Ernest and 
Davis on behalf of P&S and there is no serious legal dispute as to the right of Ernest, Davis, and 
P&S to recruit Wesco's employees. 
B. General Statement of Facts 
Ernest and Davis are the owners of Automotive Paint Warehouse ("APW"), which has 
wholesaled automotive paint and supplies to retail stores in Utah and Idaho for many years. 
Specifically, relevant to this case, APW was the primary wholesale supplier for three retail paint 
stores in Twin Falls, Pocatello, and Idaho Falls. 
Wesco purchased the three stores from their prior owner and took control of the stores on 
July 28,2005. The employees of the stores learned their stores had been purchased by Wesco when 
they received a fax from Wesco's headquarters on a Friday morning informing them that they now 
worked for Wesco. Some of them were ordered to report for duty on Saturday, the next day, for a 
mandatary all day inventory. R. Vol. IV, p. 602 (Johnston, 11:13). 
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Wesco is a Washington corporation which owns not only retail stores, but also owns the 
wholesale supply line to those stores, throughout the Northwest. Wesco's expansion into the Idaho 
market was accomplished by buying out the three Eastern Idaho stores. Because Wesco's business 
model is to own both the wholesale and retail supply chain in any area where it competes, Wesco 
immediately began supplying its new Idaho stores out of Washington, terminating APW's sales to 
the three stores in Eastern Idaho and taking a serious bite out of APW's revenues and its market 
territory. R. Vol. In, p. 457 (Ernest, 17:4-15). 
Rather than accept the loss of the Eastern Idaho market to Wesco, Ernest and Davis decided 
to use their existing Idaho corporation, Paint & Spray Supply (P&S), which had been operating retail 
storesin the Boise area for many years, to open new P&S stores in Twin Falls, Pocatello and Idaho 
Falls. Emest and Davis knew the Eastern Idah  market well, and were acquainted with the 
employees of the three stores Wesco had just purchased. They also knew most of the owners of the 
autobody shops which are the customers of thestores. Because Ernest and Davis had a longtenn 
relationship with both the employees and the customers, they were willing to invest in the new 
stores, hoping to keep the Eastern Idaho market for APW, rather thansee the market area go entirely 
to Wesc6. They correctly perceived that Wesco, as the new comer in the area, may not be as well 
prepared as it needed to be, if it hoped to capture' the Idaho market. 
Ernest and Davis moved quickly, realizing that Wesco would only become more entrenched 
with the passage of time. They opened their new stores on August 22, only 3 weeks after Wesco's 
move into the area. Part of their strategy was to approach the key employees of Wesco's new stores 
and offer them jobs. Ernest and Davis met with each of the managers and salesmen on August 17 
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and 18 (Wednesday and Thursday) and offered them jobs to start immediately. Most of the 
employees resigned from Wesco on August 19 (Friday) and the new P&S stores opened for business 
on August 22 (Monday). 
A key fact in this case is that it was not "over zealous recruiting" that motivated the 
employees to leave Wesco; rather, it was Wesco itself. It is well established that some of the 
employees were concerned-about being bought by an out of state corporation. For instance, the Twin 
Falls cmp1oyees.had been notified of Wesco's purchase of the stores when they came to work one 
morning and found a fax informing them they had been bought. The fax informed them that they 
were to cancel their plans and show up for work on Saturday to perform an inventory. R. Vol. IV, 
p.639 (Johnston. 11:ll-12:13); R. Vol. IV, p. 605 (Peck, 21:2-22); R. Vol. VI, p. 615 (Cristobal, 
20: 12-17). Others were concerned about the treatment they were receiving from Wesco's managers. 
Several mentioned trouble getting through with, phone calls to Wesco's main office and concern 
about communication with the new company. R. Vol. IV, p: 602 (Johnston, 125-25). Some 
employees were concerned about Wesco's ability to provide inventory for their customers on a 
timely basis and that Wesco's support was lacking compared to what they had been used to with 
APW. R. Vo.III, p. 597 (Hancock, 40:lO-23). All of this caused the employees to fear for the 
stability of their careers. Some wondered if lay offi were eminent or if they wouldbe firedto make 
room for out of state replacements. R. Vol. IV, p. 657, (Dayley, 19:21-26:22). Finally, Wesco 
required each employee to sign an"Acknoivledgment" form which informed them that the were "at- 
will," meaning that "either party to the relationship can terminate the employment with or without 
notice with or without cause." R. Vol. ID, p. 519. Many of the employees were nervous when they 
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learned that they could be fired at any time at Wesco's whim. When Wesco's tactics in taking over 
the Idaho stores is balanced against the stability promised by Ernest and Davis, it becomesclear that 
the employees were acting in their own self interest, not out of a malicious intent to put Wesco out 
of business. 
The point is that the employees each made a personal decision to work where they felt most 
secure. This included a desire to work for Ernest and Davis, to be supplied by APW, and to be part 
of P&S' new stores. None of the employees expressed any hatred or serious resentment toward 
Wesco (until Wesco sued them.) R. Vol. IV, p. 682 (Peck, 68:24); p. 664-665 (Dayley, 46:lO-47:5, 
49:8-19); p. 613-614 (Cristobal, 12:18-15:7); p. 640 (Johnston, 14:l-15:18). 
The employees were not offered exorbitant compensation packages. They were promised 
that their compensation would not decrease and that they would retain the same job title. It is true 
that Ernest realized his new stores would benefit from hiring the good people that he already knew 
and had been dealing with for up to twenty years. He set out to see if he could hire some of them 
and create a new opportunity that was better for himself and for them. To his surprise he ended up 
with almost all of the employees. The fact that most of the employees made a decision to work for 
P&S does not make their conduct illegal. These were at-will employees, they were not bound by any 
covenant not to compete, and they had the right to resign and go to work for P&S. 
C. Response to Misstatements of the Record Made by Wesco 
It is much simpler when a motion for summary judgment is brought on a set of stipulated 
facts, with the court only needing to correctly apply the law to the undisputed facts. This is not such 
a case. Here it seems the parties generally agree on the law, but differ sharply on what facts are 
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supported by the record, and specifically on what reasonable inferences can be drawn from the 
evidence and testimony presented below. The respondents became concerned while reviewing 
Wesco's brief that some ofthe statements made in Wesco's brief are not supported by the record. 
Respondents are quite aware that Wesco, as the party opposing s u m m q  judgment, is entitled to 
every reasonable inference; however, those inferences must be based on the record. Following is a 
list of Wesco's factual claims which are not reasonably inferred from the record: 
"Ernest and Davis boasted to Wesco Vice President Roger Howe that ifthey couldnot work 
out a deal to purchase the Idaho ~toresfrom'~aint  & Equipment, they would take Paint & 
Equipment's employees. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) Reviewing the cited record makes it clear that 
Wesco's use of the word "boasted" is an inappropriate characterization. The quoted misstatement 
ignores the purpose of this meeting, which was Wesco coming to Ernest and Davis and offering to 
buy out APW and P&S from Ernest and Davis. The response from Ernest and Davis was that they 
were well established in Idaho and were well equipped to compete in Idaho because, through APW, 
they knew both the customers and existing employees better than an outsider, such as Wesco. This 
was proven to be more of a fair warning than a boast. Ernest's statements, however characterized, 
are irrelevant, of course, because there is no serious question that Ernest and Davis, on behalf of 
P&S, had the perfect right to compete for the customers and to attempt to recruit at-will employees 
from their competitors. 
"At the time of Wesco's purchase of the Idaho Stores, Barkdull was Paint & Equipment's 
regional manager. . . Barkdull thus had supervisory responsibility over the Idaho Stores with the 
managers of those stores reporting to him. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) The record is clear that Mr. 
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Barkdull was not a "regional manager," he was "sales manager." R. Vol111,578 (Affidavit of 
Barkdull, par. 2.); R. Vol. 111, 468 (3 1 : 16). As sales manager he had no direct authority over the 
store managers or over the other employees; his responsibility was with sales. Likewise, the record 
does not support the misstatement that the managers ofthe stores reported to Barkdull. The 
misstatement illustrates Wesco's attempts to overstate Brady Barkdull's significance in the case, 
which is a key element of Wesco's appeal. 
"Barkdull's brother, defendant Hugh Barkdull, headed outside sales for the Idaho Stores at 
the time Wesco purchased the Idaho Stores. His job duties included making shop and sales calls to 
all of the body shops in the area. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) At the relevant time in this case, Hugh 
was the outside salesmen for the Pocatello Store only, not for all of the stores. R. Vol. 111,481 (10:9, 
20-22). The record cited is clear that Hugh Barkdull was an outside sales manager years earlier when 
he worked for Brady Industrial Supply, an unrelated company. Just as with Brady, Wesco is 
misrepresenting the record to make it appear that Hugh was more significant than he was. 
"Over the next few days, Ernest and Davis, on behalf of APW/P&S, formulated a plan to 
steal as many of Wesco 's employees in the Eastern Idaho market as possible andrecruitedBarkdu11 
as an ally. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8. repeated at p. 29.) To support this statement Wesco cites to 
R. Vol. III, pp. 460-62, which is a portion of the Davis deposition. A review of that testimony 
reveals that there is no evidence there that Ernest and Davis "recruited Barkdull as an ally" and that 
the cited testimony does not support, or even give rise to an inference, that Barkdull was recmited 
to help "steal" the other employees. The cited portion of the deposition actually makes it clear that 
the opposite is true: Barkdull would not commit to ErnestlDavis and wanted to wait and see what 
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other employees would do. That is the only citation to the record Wesco uses to establish that 
Barkdull was sent to recruit other employees, and it fails entirely to support such an inference that 
would contradict the remainder of the record, which establishes that Ernest and Davis did not recruit 
Barkdull to help "steal" the other employees, nor did they ask for his assistance in starting up any 
new stores. R. Vol. 111, p. 435 (18:s-15); R. Vol. 111, 578 (Affidavit of Barkdull, par. 3-5). 
"While Barkdull was still a Wesco employee, Barkdull, Ernest, and Davis worked together 
to carry out their plan. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) There is no citation for this statement, and the 
citation above it clearly does not establish that Barkdull was in on a plan to hire other employees. 
The plan was solely that of Ernest and Davis, and it is beyond dispute that the law allow Ernest and 
Davis to recruit Wesco's employees. The notion that Barkdull was the one doing the recruiting is 
purely a work of fiction written, and oft repeated, by Wesco's attorneys. 
"On August 13, 2005, Barkdull met with Ernest to scout out potential store sites for 
P&S/APW. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) This statement is misleading. The record is clear that Ernest 
, made a job offer to Barkdull while Barkdull was "riding along" with him. R. Vol. 111,439 (22:3-7) 
It is no secret that Ernest was attempting to recruit Barkdull. The testimony makes it clear that 
Ernest was talking to Barkdull while Emest looked for store sites. The record is also clear that 
Ernest did not request that Barkdull assist him in recruiting other employees and that Barkdull "put 
the ball in [Ernest's] court to recruit other employees" before Barkdull would commit to the job 
offer. R. Vol. 111, pp. 441-442 (2421-25:18). As ruled by the lower court, even if Barkdull was 
helping to find stores for P&S, this should be of no concern as the law is clear that he could have 
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even been making preparations to open his own store; it should be considered even less of aproblem 
if he was helping someone else prepare to compete. R. Vol. VIII, p. 1462-1463. 
"In fact, Barkdull and Ernest delivered a letter to a Wesco customer prior to August 19, 
2005, that identijed Barkdull as an employee of P&S; the letter was dated August 16, 2005, three 
dyspr ior  to the effective date ofBarkdull's subsequent resignation. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9.) 
This statement is a blatant misrepresentation of fact and of the record. It is a misstatement that 
~ e s c o  has refused to let go of, even in the face of the lower court's finding that it was not supported 
by the evidence. The record cited by Wesco does not establish the date, but makes it clear instead 
that the witness, Harris, did not know what day he received the letter. R. Vol. 111, p. 532 (17:l-3). 
Wesco also chooses to ignore evidence obtained after the summary judgment ruling, which now 
makes it even more clear and undisputed that this letter was not delivered until August 22, after 
Barkdull resigned. We now have the affidavit of Co~y  Hansen, the author of the letter, explaining 
the August 16 date on the letter, and making it clear that the letter was not delivered to anyone until 
after Brady had resigned from Wesco. R. Vol. V, pp. 903-904. 
"Shortlyafterscouting locations, Barkdull, Ernest, and Davis then began recruiting Wesco 's 
employees. They started with the managers. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) This statement would be 
true if it did not include Barkdull. Ernest and Davis did of the recruiting. Barkdufl was 
involved. There is nothing in the record to raise even an issue of fact as to Barkdull taking part in 
therecruithg. It is not just an absence of evidence: the record overwhelming establishes that it was 
Ernest and Davis who recruited each of the key employees. Each employee has been deposed and 
there is no evidence that Barkdull made any offers to any of them. Wesco attempts to raise an 
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implication that Barkdull helped recruit Jenny l-Jancock (Idaho Falls manager) merely because Emest 
took both Hancock and Barkdull to dinner at the same lime. Hancock makes it clear that it was 
Emest, not Barkdull, who recruited her, and that her motives had to do with working for P&S' new 
stores, not as aresult ofpressure from Barkdull. R. Vol. VII, p. 1361 (37518). Emest also clearly 
did the recruiting of the Twin Falls key employees when he took the store manager and two sales 
people (Dave Cristobal, Joel Johnston, and Travis Dayley) out to dinner and offered them jobs. R. 
Vol. IV, pp. 614 (16: 5-17:25). Brady Barkdull was not present. The Twin Falls key employees 
testified that they did not discuss their decision with Barkdull until after they had made up their 
minds to quit. R. Vol. IV. pp. 615 (18:ll-13). The employees did speak with each other, and their 
was a general feeling that if others quit, they would also quit. R. Vol. IV. pp. 615<18:24-19:6). 
While in Twin Falls, Ernest and Davis also met with Jeffrey Peck, outside sales, and offered him a 
job. Peck told Ernest and Davis he wanted to sleep on it, but called Emest the next morning at 7:30 
a.m. and accepted the offer. Brady Barkdull was not present. Peck did not discuss his decision with 
Barkdull until after he had made up his mind to quit. R. Vol. IV, pp. 674-675 (Peck, 32: 16-34:24). 
Peck affirms that while Ernest and Davis did disclose that they were making offers to other 
employees, they did not disclose whether any of the other employees had accepted their offers. R. 
Vol. lV, pp. 676 (Peck, 39:17-41:4). 
"On August 17, 2005, Howe and Wesco employee Mark Mortensen met in Pocatello to 
discuss rumors that employees would be leaving en masse and starting work for a competitor. 
Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, and Cook attended the meeting. All three lied to Wesco (Howe and 
Mortensen) and assured them there no substance to the rumors. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) The 
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cited record does not need to be read carefully to see that this is a misrepresentation of thetestimony. 
There was no discussion of employees leaving en mass-the discussion was whether Brady Barkdull 
was going to open his own store in Pocatello. Ile told Mortensen he was not going to. He did not 
lie and there is no evidence of a lie. The same testimony also makes it clear that Cook and Hugh 
Barkdull had not yet been given job offers. They did not Lie. R. Vol. V., p. 873-874, par. 4-5. 
Accusing the Barkdulls and Cook of lying at this meeting is another distortion of the facts; the 
accusation is not based on a reasonable inference from the evidence, and does not constitute a 
genuine issue of material fact. 
"Barkdull discussedwithPeckandDayEey their resignations. " @.ppellant'sBrief, p. 9-10.) 
This is not so much a misrepresentation of the evidence as it is a blatant out of context statement 
which omits the crucial fact: The discussions between Barkdull and Peck and Dayley took place 
after Ernest and Davis had made job offers to Peck and Dayley. R. Val. 111, p. 472 (Barkdull, 79: 10- 
15, 80:16-24). Both Peck and Dayley testified that Barkdull did not speak with them about a job 
offer and that they had already made up their minds before discussing their decisions with Barkdull. 
R. Vol. IV, p. 660 (Dayley, 27:25-28,28:24-29,32:11-17; R. Vol. IV, p. 659-661; and R.'Vol. IV, 
,pp. 674-675,679 peck, 32:16-34:24,50:1-12). 
"With their departure Pom Wesco, the employees stole Wesco proprietary customer 
information, computers, paint chip books, files, and Rolodexes. " ( Appellant's Brief, p. 1 1 .) 
Examining the record for support for this broad statement makes it clear why the lower court rejected 
the broad statement and found instead that the only things taken were a "paint book" (essentially a 
free catalogue supplied by apaint manufacturer), and a few business cards (which Johnston felt were 
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his own property). These items were taken by two of the employees who Wesco dismissed from the 
case, making these minor events wholly irrele~ant.~ 
"Prior to resigning, the defendant employeesfaxedfrom the Idaho Stoves information about 
their new businesses andtheir locations. " (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12.) This is one of the most blatant 
misrepresentations in the record, as proven by the very document Wesco refers the court to. R. Vol. 
111, p. 426. This document was faxed on August 22, three days after the employees resigned. The 
other two pages Wesco refers the court to are R. Vol. 111, p. 574 and 575, which are not dated, but 
lack any evidence whatsoever that they were mailed from a Wesco store, or that they were sent 
before August 22. Thus, the record is undisputed that the letter was faxed on August 22, three days 
after the resignation. This is similar to the red herring Wesco puts forth in conjunction with Wes 
Harris, an owner of a body shop in Preston, testifying that he was not able to recall the exact date he 
receivedasimilardocument. The lower court ruled that a lack of recollection cannot be used to raise 
an issue of fact as to whether the employees began recruiting customersfor P&S before they resigned 
from Wesco. Now, with evidence not available at the time Judge Smith made his ruling, we know 
from the Affidavit of Cory Hansen that no documents were sent to customers until the new stores 
opened on August 22. R Vol. V, pp. 903-9044 The bottom line is that there is no evidence that the 
3Note that it was Craig Rossum who made these broad accusations, but he did not even 
work at the stores at the time of the resignation in August 2005, and he had only worked in Idaho 
Falls. R. Vol. In, p. 514 (Rossum, 93:14-19). Mr. Rossum's broad accusations are not 
corroborated by any witnesses with actual knowledge or who would actually know if anything 
was taken. 
4That the flyers and letters were delivered after August 22 is also made clear by the 
testimony of Marty Evans, who assisted Wesco between August 22 and 24 in contacting 
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employees contacted a single customer about their decision to quit prior to tiieir resignation from 
Wesco. 
D Undisputed Facts Justifying Summary Judgment 
Thus, we are left with the following undisputed facts: 
1. All of the employees who quit Wesco were at-will employees. 
2. None of the employees were bound by non-compete agreements. 
3.  All eight of the "key" employeess who quit their jobs at Wesco, including managers and 
sales people, were directly recruited by Ernest and Davis. 
4. Barkdull did not recruit, or make a job offer, to any other employee, including both "key" 
and "non-key, "6 employees. 
5. Ernest and Davis did not ask Barkdull to recruit any other employees. 
6 .  Ernest and Davis did not ask any of Wesco's "key" employees to recruit "non-key 
employees. "' 
customers and kept running into the P&S people who were also busy contacting customers 
during the first few days that the P&S stores had opened. R. Vol. VII, p. 1237 (Evans, 635-  
64:4). 
'These eight "key employees" include Brady Barkdull (outside sales manager), Hugh 
Barkdull (outside sales in Pocatello), Mike Cook (store manager in Pocatello), Jenny Hancock 
(store manager in Idaho Falls), Travis (store manager in Twin Falls), Jeffrey Peck (outside sales 
in Twin Falls), Joel Johnston, (counter in Twin Falls), David Cristobal (counter in Twin Falls). 
6The five "non-key" employees included Chantil Dobbs (delivery in Twin Falls), Shelby 
Thomson and Kelly McClure (counter-worker and delivery in Idaho Falls), Jodee Reed and 
Tiffany Thomsen (counter-worker and delivery in Pocatello). 
'Each employee who quit Wesco had their own reasons for making the switch to P&S, 
(and have testifieil about those reasons in detail). In recounting their reasons for switching to 
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7. Of the "key" employees who discussed quitting with "non-key employees," only Cook is 
still a defendant. (Wesco voluntarily dismissed the others from the suit.) 
8. None of the employees spoke lo customers, or sent documents to customers, about the new 
P&S stores until after the employees had quit their jobs at Wesco. 
9. None of the employees who quit became owners in the new P&S stores; the employees all 
took essentially the same job, at the same pay. 
10. Although Wesco remains suspicion that Cook erased some files off his computer, there is 
no evidence that Wesco suffered any damage at all from Cook's decision to clean up his 
computer before he left. All of Wesco's important data was stored on a central computer 
in Washington, not on Cook's computer. 
E. The Law is clear that all allegations against Ernest, Davis, APWand P&S were 
properly dismissed on summaryjudgment because they had the right to compete for 
Wesco's customers and employees and did so in a manner that strictly followed the 
law. 
The lower court correctly ruled that it was not illegal for Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW8 to 
open the three new stores; that it was legal for these four defendants to recruit Wesco's employees; 
and that it was perfectly legal for these defendants to compete for Wesco's customers. Thus, all 
causes of action against these four defendants were dismissed. The basis for their dismissal is 
obvious: their conduct in recruiting employees, opening new retail stores and competing to supply 
P&S, none of the employees attributed their decision to Barkdull. A few were disgruntled with 
Wesco, but most made the switch because they knew and trusted Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW 
in general. A few of the "non-key" employees quit only to avoid being left behind. 
'Since APW did not own the three new stores, it is difficult to imagine why Wesco 
brought suit against APW. 
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automotive paint and equipment to the Eastern Idaho market is well within the law, and within the 
policy of the State of Idaho: 
(1) The Idaho legislature finds that fair competition is fundamental to the free market 
system. The unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of Idaho's economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and 
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conducive to the preservation of our democratic and social institutions. 
(2) The purpose of this chapter is to maintain and promote economic competition in 
Idaho commerce, to provide the benefits of that competition to consumers and 
businesses in the state, and to establish efficient and economical procedures to 
accomplish these purposes and policies. 
Idaho Code § 48-102. The three new P&S stores definitely increased competition, which was good 
for the employees, as well as for the consumers. Wages are up, prices are down and everyone is 
happy, except Wesco. 
In order to find liability against Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW, Wesco asks this court to create 
new law. That new law would prohibit a company from recruiting at-will employees of other 
companies. In deed, this new law would create a presumption of an "an improper purpose" and 
would make it so that successful competition is proof that "wrongful means" had been used. It 
would be a'tenible law, and would contradict the economic policyof the state. 
Wesco attempts t'o use allegations of "interference with contract" to get at its competitors, 
Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW, a i~d points out that even at-will employees have a contractual 
relationship-albeit an "at-will" contractual relationship that could be interfered with. Such a rule 
contradicts. the very law citedby Wesco: that to be actionable, offering a job to a eompetitor's 
employee must be "Wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of interference itself." The rule 
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couldnot be more plain, and the facts could not be more plain. Ernest andDavis offeredjobs to each 
of Wesco's key employees. They did so to get them to quit Wesco and come to work for them. The 
lower court's statement of the law was right, such conduct is legal and is avalid and important aspect 
of our economy. The lower court was right to dismiss the allegations against Ernest, Davis, P&S 
and APW. 
l? There is no evidence that Brady Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull and Mike Cook were 
retained to recruit other employees. 
Wesco seems to correctly perceive the iinpossibility of convincing this court that Ernest, 
Davis, APW and P&S did not have the right to compete. Instead, Wesco focuses its attention on 
Brady Barkdull, and to a lesser extent his brother Hugh and Mike Cook, attempting to cast these 
employees as the true bad actors in its loss of its employees. Wesco asks to court to believe that it 
was really Brady Barkdull who did the recruiting and that he was "aided and abetted" by Ernest and 
Davis. Thus, Wesco attempts to focus the court's attention on whether Wesco's new employees 
more or less recruited each other, hoping the court will look past the glaringly obvious missing fact, 
which is the absence of a motive. None of the employees who quit Wesco became owners in the 
new stores. Instead their motives are clearly stated in the record: dissatisfaction with being bought 
out by Wesco; a trusting relationship with Ernest and Davis; and a fear of being left behind. 
The real questions on appeal are: Where is the evidence that the Barkdulls or Mike Cook 
were the guilty parties? Where is the evidence that Ernest and Davis asked the Barkdulls or Cook 
to recruit other employees? Where is the evidence that any.key employees were recruited by anyone 
Page 23 
other than Ernest and Davis? Without being able to supply this evidence, Wesco has no justification 
for its conspiracy theory. , 
G. Idaho law allows employees to quit theirjobs andgo to workfor competitors or to 
start their own competing businesses. 
Wesco claims P&S should be held liable for Wesco's employees conduct pursuant to a rule 
of law supposedly found in Alexander 61 Alexander Benefits Serv., Inc. v BeneJits Brokers 
Consultants, Inc., 756 F. Supp 1408 (D. Or. 1991). There are several problems with plaintiff's 
reliance on Alexander. First, Alexander is not an Idaho case and does not represent Idaho law 
Second, Alexander relied on a comment in Restatement (2nd) of Agency 5 393, comment (e), to lend 
supporito amling that went against strong legal precedent establishing an employee's right to make 
preparations to compete. Third, Alexander is factually different because in Alexander it was a former 
employee who was setting up the competing business; whereas in our situation the employees had 
no ownership in the new stores. Fourth, there is zero evidence that Ernest and Davis "encouraged" 
or "participated" any alleged improper conduct by the employees. Wesco has supplied no evidence 
that Ernest and Davis told the employees when or how to write their letters of resignation, or that 
Ernest and Davis sent prospective employees back to recruit other employees. 
Wesco asks this court to focus on comment (e) from the Restatement (2"') of Agency 5 393, 
claiming that the comment "clearly" makes it a breach of duty for an employee to solicit the "best" 
employees. The Restatement comment does not "clearly" say this at all. It says: 
e. Preparation for competition after termination of agency. After the termination of 
his agency, in the absence of a restrictive ameement, the agent can properly compete 
with his principal as to matters for which he has been employed. See 5 396. 
before the termination of the aeencv, he is entitled to make arrangements to compete, 
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except that he cannot properly use confidential information peculiar to h ~ s  employer's 
business and acquired therein. Thus, before the end of his employment. he can 
properly purchase a rival business and upon termination of employment immediately 
comuele. He is not, however, entitled to solicit customers for such rival business 
before the end of his employment nor can he properly do other similar acts in direct 
competition with the employer's business. 
The limits of m p e r  conduct with reference to securing the services offellow 
em~lovees are not well marked. An employee is subject to liability if, before or after 
leaving the employment, he causes fellow emplovees to break their contracts with the 
employer. On the other hand, it is normally uermissible for employees of a firm, or 
for some of its partners. to agree among themselves. while still employed, that they 
will engage in competition with the ftrm at the end of the period specified in their 
employment contracts .... [Underlining not in original.] 
Further, it seems there are two facts presumed in comment e that do not exist in the Wesco case. 
One is that the person soliciting his fellow employees is the one also setting up the competing 
business. This crucial fact is missing: none of the employees had an ownership or other interest in 
the new stores and none ofthem were promised bonuses for hiring other employees, a key element 
present in every case where employees were found liable for recruiting. Wesco is asking the court 
to stretchcomment (e) into aL'clear" rule prohibiting employees from speaking with each other about 
their plans to quit or seek other employment-a rule that would directly contravene the remaining 
language in the comment-that it is "normally permissible for employees . . . to agree among 
themselves . . . that they will engage in competition." These employees were simply choosing to 
change jobs, at basically the same pay rate and levek They had no motive do to anything but try to 
switch to an employer they felt more comfortable with. There is no rule making it illegal to tell other 
employees of a plan to switch jobs. 
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More recently, in Restatement (3'*) Of Agency § 8.04 (2006) we find the following Reporters 
Note, explaining a change between the 2 "d and 3"' Restatement that backs away from the 
controversial parts of comment e: 
a. Relationship to Restatement Second, Agency. This section is the counterpart of 
Restatement Second, Agency $5 393 ,394, and 396(a). Although $394 is formulated 
more broadly, requiring that an agent refrain from acting or agreeing to act "during 
the period of his agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of the 
principal in matters in which the agent is employed," the specific situations discussed 
in the section involve action taken on behalf of a principal's competitors. T& 
formulation in this Restatement does not encompass an agent's agreement to act on 
behalf of or to assist a com~etitor. This is because such a formulation appears to 
contravene the well-settled right of emplovees and other agents to make preparations 
to comDete. See Restatement Second, Agency $ 393 , Commenf, which recognizes 
that "Lelven before the termination of the agency," the a ~ e n t  "is entitled to make 
arrangements to compete, except that he cannot properlv use confidential' information 
peculiar to his employer's business and acauired therein." Comment e continues, 
"[tlhus. before the end of his emplovment, he can properlypurchase a rival business 
and uvon termination of employment immediately compete." This Restatement does 
not endorse Comment e's categorical assertion that an agent's ownership of a 
competing business would not breach the agent's duties to the principal. 
Restatement (31d) Of Agency 5 8.04 (2006), Reporter's Note (a). Despite the fact that the purpose 
of the Restatement rule is to solidify an employee's right to quit and find better employment, or to 
start his own competing business (not an issue in our case), Wesco asks the court to single out a 
solitary comment in a note, and even claims this comment makes the law "clear" in its favor. What 
is clear is that employees do have the right to quit their jobs and take better jobs. The fact that this 
decision is made as part of a group cannot make it wrong. How can the law tell an at-will employee, 
he has the right to quit without notice or reason, but if more than one of the employee tries to quit 
at the same time, they're in big trouble? That is not the law. Keep in mind that, under the at-will 
relationship Wesco had with these employees, Wesco could close its stores and fire all employees 
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at any time without notice or reason, and it would not have broken any law. Why does Wesco think 
the at-will doctrine should only work it its favor? 
Wesco cites to R Homes Corp. v. Hcrr, 142 Idaho 87 123 P.3d 720 (Idaho App. 2005), which 
is actually a case in the defendants' favor, wherein the court reaffirmed the same iower court's 
decision granting summary judgment against an employer who sued its former employee for starting 
a new company and hiring away many of the former employer's best people. The evidence in this 
case is even more clear: Each employee has testified about being recruited by Ernest and Davis, not 
by Barkdull. 
Without having much luck finding Idaho cases to support its claims, Wesco turns to cases 
from other states. In one case, Gresham &Associates., Inc. v. Strianese, 595 S.E.2d 82 (GA. Ct. 
App. 2004), the court describes the facts that it 'felt could result in liability. These facts included a 
defendant who specifically met with other employees and gave them job offers, including evidence 
that he even arranged a loan so one employee could repay a 401 (k) loan before quitting. Gresham, 
at 85. There is one very big difference between the facts in Gresham and Wesco's facts. In Gresham 
the court could cite to facts in the records that raised a genuine issue of material fact. Wesco cannot 
point to any such facts. It attempts to cast Barkdull in the same light as the defendant inGresham, 
but fails to acknowledge that it was not Barkdull who made the job offers and, further, that there is 
no evidence that Barkdull recruited the other employees. 
Throughout its briefing, Wesco speaks often of the at-will employees having duties of 
"absolute fidelity" and of a "high fiduciary duty;" however, no law is cited that requires an at-will 
employee to give notice of his intention to quit his job, or prohibits an employee from discussing his 
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plans to quit a job or to accept other employment. Likewise, there is no Idaho case requiring that an 
at will employee warn his employer of his intention to quit, or to "rat out" other employees who are 
thinking about taking another job, which are the two things Wesco claims Barkdull and Cook should 
have done, despite their at-will status. In support of its claim that at-will employees have a duty of 
"absolute fidelity," Wesco relies on R. G. Nelson, A.I. A. v. Steer, 1 18 Idaho, 409,412,797 P.2d 1 17, 
120 (1 990). A careful review of R. G. Nelson (by simply searching the case for the phrase "absolute 
fidelity") shows that the phrase does not appear anywhere. R.G. Nelson does not use that phrase. 
In fact , R.G. Nelson does not even deal with at-will employees, but with an architect's duty to his 
client. R.G. Nelson does not support Wesco's case 
In order to prevail in this case Wesco needs the court to agree to two rules of law that do not 
exist: (1) That employees do not have the right to discuss with one another a decision to quit and 
go to work for a different employer; and (2) if more than a few at-will employees quit at the same 
time (the en masse resignation), they have broken a law or been actionably disloyal. Neither of these 
propositions represent the law in Idaho. 
Jenny Hancock, the Idaha Falls manager, best described the conflict she felt in making her 
decision to quit. She describes trying to decide whether to give the customary two weeks notice, or 
just to quit. She saw the dilemma. If she quits immediately she leaves Wesco with a problem of 
replacing her. If she stays for two weeks, she will be accused of soliciting other employees and 
customers, a problem many modem employers deal with by immediately terminating any employee 
who gives notice of an intent to quit. She chose to quit immediately. She should not be liable for 
her decision. 
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NI There is no evidence to support Wesco 's accusations of a Civil Conspiracy behoeen 
the Defendants 
In a desperate attempt to prove something illegal about ErnestlDavis/P&S's successful 
recruitment of their former employees, Wesco makes broad allegations based on the simple fact of 
a lunch meeting between Ernest and Davis and Barkdull. Even though it is known what happened 
at that meeting, Barkdull was given a job offer which he declined to decide on immediately. He' 
wanted to $ee what other employees were going to do first. Ignoring this evidence, Wesco asks this 
court to speculate that they had a far more dark and sinister purpose. Wesco presumes, with no 
evidence, that all of the testimony about the meeting is a lie and that this was really Barkdull and 
Ernest and Davis formulating an evil plan to put Wesco out of business in Eastern Idaho. The best 
Wesco can come up with is an accusation that Ernest and Davis invited Barkdull to be an "ally" in 
a conspiracy to open new stores and to recruit Wesco's employees. Because Ernest and Davis were 
successful, the court is asked to speculate that Barkdull was helping with the recruiting. This 
speculation is requested despite the uncontroverted testimony of each and every employee describing 
why they chose to work for P&S, without a single employee mentioning Barkdull as a causative 
factor. 
Wesco cites the conspiracy rule, but then forgets the rule. A civil conspiracy must be illegal 
in some way other than the conspiracy itself. Yet we know that it is appropriate for one business to 
solicit its competitor's at-will employees, thus what Ernest and Davis did cannot be considered to 
be a civil conspiracy, since what they did was legal. If Wesco had a fact it could cite from the record 
establishing that Barkdull agreed to do something illegal to recruit employees, it might have a case, 
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but there is no such evidence. 
The civil conspiracy claim was properly dismissed, as it was in the McPherson case 
(McPherson v Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 317 (2003), which is cited by Wesco, even though it 
too resulted in the civil conspiracy claim being tossed out on summary judgment. 
1: The fact that Wescopaid for "good will" does not mean it is entitled to aprotected 
monopoly, or that it is entitled to have its employees become indentured servants. 
On a final note, Wesco makes much of its purchase of, and payment for, good will. The 
question is, was Wesco victimized by unlawful competition, or was it victimized by its own failure 
to properly evaluate the market and realize the weak position it would be in if Ernest and Davis, who 
already had their own extensive good will in the area, refused to accept APW's losses and chose to 
open new retail stores. Wesco appears to have paid far too much for the good will of a former owner 
who did not actually have the good will to sell. Much of the good will in the Eastern Idaho market 
already belonged to APW, Ernest, Davis and P&S. Wesco also claims it paid for employee loyalty, 
without realizing that employee loyalty cannot be purchased, but must be earned. Wesco also paid 
for customer loyalty, without realizing that customers prefer to have competition from multiple 
sellers. Wesco's good will payment bought it only the right to be free from the former owner's 
competition; Wesco could never purchase the right to enjoy a monopoly or to be free from 
competition for its employees. 
J: Conclusion. 
The biggest flaw in Wesco's argument is in the way it puts the cart before the horse. In its 
anxiousness to prove an actionable case, Wesco attempts to re-characterize the case to make 
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Barkdull the main character. At one point Wesco goes so far as to claim that Ernest and Davis 
"aided and abetted" Barkdull in hiring away Wesco's employees. Completely forgetting that it was 
not Barkdull who was starting a new business, that Barkdull had no motive to recruit anyone, and 
that not a single employee claims to have been recruited by Barkdull. In Wesco's fictionalized 
version of the facts, we have Barkdull starting a new business "aided and abetted" by Emest and 
Davis. Wesco really needs to prove that Barltdull was asked to help Ernest and Davis, and that 
Barkdull recruited the other employees for Ernest and Davis. There is no evidence of this. None 
whatsoever. Wesco repeatedly refers to a "concocted scheme," a "conspiracy," a "secret plan" 
betweenBarkdul1 and Ernest andDavis. Wesco never cites any evidence for this. Lacking any such 
evidence, Wesco attempts the old trial tactic of repetition, repetition, repetition-believing that if it 
makes the same false claim often enough, the court will start believing the fiction and not bother to 
loolc at the actual evidence in the record. 
Cross Appeal 
I. The defendant'slrespondent's should prevail on their cross-appeal and be granted a 
complete summary bdgment on all allegations because ~ e s c o  eannot provia breach 
of dutyand,additionaUy, cannot prove any damages caused by any alleged misconduct. 
Most of the defendants are already dismissed fiom this case, either by the court below or by 
Wesco's voluntary dismissal of the employees. All that remain are Brady Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull 
and Cook, and possibly P&S in some limited manner for accepting the benefit of anything unlayful 
that was done. Based on a far more complete record than Judge Smith had when he granted the first 
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summary judgment opinion in this matter, it is evident that a complete and full summary judgment 
is warranted on behaif of the remaining defendants 
The lower court cited Restatement 20d of Agency § 3939 in its analysis. As discussed above, 
in 2006, at about the time Judge Smith was writing his decision, the Restatement 3rd of Agency was 
being published. It replaces 5 393 with: 
3 8.04. Competition. Throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent 
has a duty to refrain from competing with the orinci~al and from taking action on - - 
behalf of or otherwise assistingthe principal's competitors. During that time, an agent 
mav take action, not otherwise wrongful, to prevare for competition following . . - 
termination of the agencv relationship. [Emphasis supplied.] 
The underlined sentence is new, although the rule about preparing to compete was clearly stated in 
the notes of the old version. Both legally and factually, the Barkdulls and Cook did not violate the 
rule as stated in either the 2nd or the 3"1 Restatement. 
A. Counts IandII (breach ofernployee duty of loyallyl should be disrnissedagainst the 
Barkdulls and Cook because there is no evidence that either ofthern bveached theiv 
duties. 
1. Neither of the Barkdulls recruited any other employees. All key 
employees were recruited directly by P&S and all non-key employees 
learned about the jobs from other employees, not from the Barkdulls. 
There is no evidence to refute Brady's testimony that he was not asked to recruit other 
employees, that he did not talk to other employees about resigning until after they had made their 
decisions to quit, and that he himself was being recruited by Ernest and did not make up his mind 
'The Restatement 2nd of Agency 393 stated simply: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent 
is subject to a duty not to compete with the principal concerning the subject matter of his 
agency ." 
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for sure until after some of the other employees. R. Vol. 111, p. 578." None of the key employees 
claim that Brady recruited them and there is no evidence that he extended job offers to any of the 
employees. The evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Barkdull was not involved in recruiting. 
R. Vol. IV, p 674 (Peck, 32:16-33:ll); R. Vol. IV, p. 612 (Dayley, 49:3-7); R. Vol. IV, p. 642-643 
(Johnston, p. 22:8-28:20; R. Vol. IV, p. 613-615 (Cristobal, 13:2-19:19); R. Vol. 111, p. 489, (Cook, 
-51 :25-52:21)." This evidence is undisputed and, even construed fully in favor of Wesco, cannot be 
characterized as an effort by Barkdull to recruit employees to work for P& S while he was still an 
employee of Wesco. He breached no duty of loyalty. 
Giving Wesco the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the most that can be said is that, after 
Davis and Ernest offered jobs to Wesco's key employees, including Brady Barkdull, some of the key 
employees discussed their decisions with each other and with non-key employees, but this clearly 
did not iiivolve Brady offering jobs to anyone, or even influencing anyone. Without evidence of any 
recruiting conduct by Brady, the remaining portions of Counts I and 11 should be dismissed against 
him. 
''The closest thing Wesco can point to is the fact that Barkdull was present at dinner 
when Ernest made the offer to Hancock. However, her testimony is very clear that she was given 
the job offer by Ernest and that her decision to leave was not based on pressure from Brady. Her 
reasons for quitting do not include any evidence that she was influenced at all by Brady. She had 
known Ernest for 2 years, as the owner of APW, and her decision was a choice to work for him, 
rather than Wesco. R, Vol. 111, p. 494 (Hancock, 24:7-19). She disagreed with Wesco's 
attorney's assertion that Barkdull had "greased" the situation. R. Vol. 111, p. 497 (Hancock, 37:s- 
18). 
"Although Brady had a telephone conversation with Dayley, and possibly other 
employees on Friday, the day of their resignation, it is clear that the others had already made the 
decision to resign after being recruited by Ernest and Davis. R. Vol. 111, p. 472-473 (Barkdull, 
78:7-82: 17). 
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As to Hugh Barlcdull, there is no evidence of recruiting whatsoever. It appears that Wesco 
does not really even take the position that Hugh Barkdull did anything improper, as Wesco fails to 
discuss him in its brief. Thus, Hugh Barkdull should also be dismissed from the suit 
2. Cook's conduct in mentioning his resignation to fellow employees and in 
drafting a form letter of resignation that was used by other employees is not 
actionable and caused no damage. 
Cook was recruited by Ernest on Wednesday evening, August 17,2005. After he made up 
his mind to resign, he downloaded a resignation form letter from the internet that was copied by 
other employees in Pocatello and Twin Falls. In light of the rule stated in Restatement 3'* of Agency 
5 8.04, it is clear that Cook's conduct is not actionable and does not amount to a breach of duty. 
This is because it is undisputed that the letter was given to other employees only after they had 
already decided to resign. R. Val. IV, p. 661 (Dayley, 33:l-15); . R. Vol. 111, p. 471 (Barkdull, 
76:15); R. Vol. IV, p. 645 (Johnston, 33:6-24); R. Vol. VII, par. 11.. The employees have explained 
that it was more convenient to use the same resignation letter Mike had found on the internet than 
for each employee to take the time to write their own letters. There is no evidence that Cook did 
anything to influence the other employees, or that he was asked to influence other employees. 
Without such evidence, the remaining portions of Counts I and I1 should be dismissed against Cook 
On Friday, August 19, after he decided to switch employers, Cook announced his plan to quit 
to the two counter-help people working in the same store. They decided to quit as well. What is 
completely lacking is any evidence that Cook was told to recruit these employees. This was not the 
unfolding of a secret scheme; it was an employee deciding to quit his job and then inviting two other 
workers to do the same thing. This case is nothing like the cases cited by Wesco where an employee 
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decided to copy his employer's business model and begins malting plans months in advance to not 
only copy the business model, but to take the employees and customers with him, and then this 
employee continues to work as a "wolf in sheep's clothing" to cariy out his plan over a period of 
weeks or months. Without proof of a "conspiracy" or "evil plan" the court should rule as a matter 
of law that Cook's conduct is not actionable. 
B. Counts I and II against Brady and Cookshouldalso be dismissed because Wesco has 
no proof of any damage caused by their conduct. 
An equally compelling reason for dismissing Counts I and I1 against Brady and Cook is that 
there is no evidence that their actions in this regard caused any damage to Wesco.' Count I, 
Interference with Prospective Advantage, is a tort, and proof that damages were proximately caused 
by negligent conduct is an essential element of every tort, including a tortious interference with 
contract. Magic Valley TruckBrokers, Inc. vs. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110,982 P.2d 945 (1999). Count 
11, Breach of ContractBreach of Duties, is arguably a contract action (Judge Smith held that the duty 
of loyalty is implied in the unwritten contract between every employer and employee), and the law 
requires that a plaintiff establish, with "reasoaable certainty" a causal link between the breach of 
contract and the damages claimed. 
As unfair as it may seem to a disappointed plaintiff in a business loss case where nothing can 
be recovered, the rule in Idaho is quite clear that proof of damages must be specifically proven and 
causation for those damages must be shown. Proof of damages is an element of a law suit and no 
matter how upset the plaintiff may be that he feels a wrong has been done, if he cannot prove his 
damages, and that a legal wrong caused the damages, his case has no value. Dunn v. Ward, 105 
Idaho 354,357,670 P.2d 59,62 (1983). There are numerous cases where a business plaintiffs case 
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has been dealt a fatal blow for failing to have any proof of damages. For instance, in Dunn the court 
found that there was a clear and admitted violation of a non-compete agreement, but ruled that there 
was not a specific proof of damage and awarded plaintiff nothing. The supreme court affirmed: 
In this case the trial judge found that Dunn failed to prove the amount of his damages 
with reasonable certainty. First, he presented no evidence at all showing any loss of 
business, loss of customers or loss ofprofit to his own business attributable to Ward's 
breach. In addition, although Dunnpresented some prodof Ward's profits, he failed 
to show any relation between those profits and Dutnl's losses. 'Ward testified as to 
gross sales to particular customers., but failed to provide any figures to indicate how 
many ~rohibited items were sold in each zroup-rofit was included on 
a "per prohibited item" basis. Because of thislack of proof on the part of Dunn, we 
hold that the trial court was correct in entering judgment for Ward as to the claimed 
lost profits. 
Dunn, at 358,63. This is very similar to what Wesco is attempting to do in this case. It wishes to 
tell the jury that it made $4.5 million less than it hoped for, but gives no explanation of what 
wrongful conduct caused the losses. Dunn makes it clear that this is improper and Wesco cannot 
prove any damages. A failure to establish a causal link between the alleged facts and the claimed 
damages is fatal to both a tort and a contract action. Dunn v. Ward, 105 Idaho 354,357,670 P.2d 
A review of the Idaho cases on damages shows that the law distinguishes between the level 
of proof required to prove the element of the existence of damages caused by the alleged conduct, 
which requires "reasonable certainty," $nd the required proof of the amount of damages caused by 
the alleged conduct, which requires less certainty. 
Obviously the amount of damages caused only becomes an issue if the existence of some 
damages caused by wrongful conduct has first been proven with "reasonable certainly." Wesco's 
insistence that it need only prove that the remaining Defendants' conduct was a "substantial factor" 
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in its losses is skipping over the first element. Wesco must first prove that Defendants' caused some 
damage with "reasonable certainty," and then must also prove the conduct was a "substantial factor" 
in the cause of the loss. Wesco fails in both respects. Note that the focus on both issues is on 
causation; it is not enough to prove damages, if there is no causal link between the damages and 
wrongful conduct. See Trilogy Networks Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 11 19 (Idaho 2007), 
where the trial court specifically agreed that there had been a breach of a non-compete clause but 
then entered a judgment for no money. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed: 
Trilogy failed to persuade the district court of any correspondence between what its 
profit would have been and Johnson's actual profit, and thus failed to take the 
measure of its damages out of the realm of speculation. Therefore, thc district court 
did not err when it declined to award damages. 
Trilogy, at 1 1 19. Thus, because plaintiff did not make a specific link between the breach of contract 
and an item of damages, its case failed. 
Magic Valley Truckis exactly on point against Wesco's case. The decline in Wesco's profits 
could have been caused by, among many other possible causes, the at-will employees resigning, the 
absence of non-compete agreements, and lawful competition from P&S which was going to occur 
whether the employees lee Wesco or not. Wesco has failed entirely to prove a link between their 
$4.5 million damage claim and any alleged misconduct. Another case, R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 
11 8 Idaho, 409,412,797 P.2d 117, 120 (1990), cited by Wesco on a different point also ruled that, 
regardless of whether there was a breach of duty, or an inference, if there is no proof of damages 
there is no valid cause of action: R.G. Nelson, 41 1, 119. 
This lack o fa  causal link can exist either: (1) where there is no proof that the conduct caused 
any harm, or (2) where there is proof that the loss would have occurred anyway, regardless of the 
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defendant's conduct. IDJI 2.30.2; Restatement of Torts 2d 5 432,433. Both of these defects exist 
in Wesco's claim for damages. 
For example, in a case where an employee was found to have breached his duty of loyalty 
to his employer by assisting a competitor that he planned to go to work for, the case was dismissed. 
Despite clear proof of wrongful conduct, the court dismissed the action because of lack of proof of 
causation ofdamages. Cudahy Co. vs. America Laboratories, Inc., 3 13 F.Supp. 1339,1349 (D. Neb. 
1970).12 This absence of proof of damages has also been the basis for the dismissal of suits against 
former employees in other cases, as in SaksFifrh Avenue, Inc. v. James, LTD., 630 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 
2006). 
While the cases cited above were not decided on summary judgment, the law stated in these 
cases controls the result here and compels summary judgment because there is no evidence in this 
case to support the link between losses claimed and actionable conduct. For instance starting in 
Trugreen Companies, LLC vs. Scotts Luwn Service, 508 F.Supp.2d 937 (2007), and continuing in 
Trugreen v. Moweu, 2007 WL 1696860 (same case), a suit that is amazingly similar to Wesco's, a 
Utah court relied on Idaho law to grant summary judgment to the Idaho defendants.'" 
''To show how similar Wesco's case is to Cudahy, consider the court's next remark, 
demonstrating that the court had been dealing with the s&e type of generalization of damages 
that Wesco is attempting in this case: "The Court would only further add that plaintiff in its 
arguments, has made claim that all of these actions on the p& of all of the defendants are 
combined in a calculated plan to steal plaintiffs suppliers and customers. If there is no actionable 
wrong as to any of the parts of what plaintiff terms a calculated plan the sum of the whole can be 
no different." Cudahy, 1349. 
13As to the Utah claims in Trugreen, the judge certified the issue to the Utah Supreme 
Court to see if Utah would adopt the same law as Idaho had adopted in the Dunn case, which it 
now has in Trugreen Companies, LLC. vs. Mower Brother Inc., 199 P.3d 929 (2008). 
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This analysis applies to Wesco's case. Essentially, as inSaks and Trugreen, it is obvious that 
Wesco's claimed $4.5 million dollar loss was caused by numerous factors unrelated to the remaining 
allegations in this case. These other factors, which constitute lawful competition include: (I) the 
existence of the new P&S stores, (2) the lawful recruitment of keyemployees by Ernest and Davis, 
(3) lawful competition from former key employ.ees who were lawfully recruited, (4) the employees 
were at-will employees, (5) competition from employees who were not bound by non-compete 
agreements, (6) the goodwill that Ernest and Davis already had in Idaho whellthey opened the stores, 
with or without the help ofthe employees, (7) the lawfiil resignation ofnon-key employees who were 
at-will and who had no contact with the remaining Defendants during the time they made the 
decision to resign, (8) the resignations of at-will employees who could have quit at any time for any 
reason, (9) the fact that some damages were caused by ~ e s c o ' s  own poor relationship with its 
employees, (10) the absence of evidence that any employees who were not directly recruited by 
Ernest or Davis (the "non-key" employees) had any effect on any customers switching their business, 
(1 1) the fact that some of Wesco's alleged losses may have been caused by employees whom Wesco 
recently dismissed fromthe case, and finally, (12) Wesco's own faults incausing its own losses, such 
as operating under the misguided belief that it should never have to worry about competition from 
any source, apparently paying far too much for avulnerable company, failing to make its employees 
feel secure, and failing to require non-compete agreements of key employees. 
The cause of Wesco's losses are obvious and have nothing to do with wrongful conduct by 
the Barkdulls or Cook. Without being able to prove this causal link, s m a r y  judgment should be 
granted 
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1. There is no evidence that Brady Barkdull's conduct caused any 
damage to Wesco because all such damage would have occurred 
anyway due to the lawful competition of others. 
Even if it could be shown that Brady wrongfully recruited key employees, (which cannot be 
shown as outlined above), the damage issue is whether such wrongful recruiting, if it could be 
proven, caused Wesco a loss. There is no such evidence at all. There is no proof of a link between 
Brady's conduct and the alleged $4.5 million dollar loss. 
In other words, if Wesco's damages are the loss of profits associated with customers going 
to P&S, Wesco has failed entirely to establish even one of the numerous links that would have to be 
proven between Brady recruiting a key employee and a customer leaving, keeping in mind that if the 
customer would have left anyway, damages have not been and camot be proven. 
For instance, once Brady quit, there is no prohibition against him recruiting the employees. 
Thus, if Brady recruited employees after he quit and persuaded them all to follow him, this would 
have been perfectly legal, and Wesco's claimed loss of profits would be exactly the same. 
The result is the same if Brady had gone away to an isolated island without his cell phone, 
leaving only Ernest and Davis to recruit, which is about what happened, since Brady did no 
recruiting. Ernest and Davis would have successfully recruited the same employees without Brady, 
and Wesco's losses would be the same. Wesco cannot link any conduct by Brady to their claimed 
losses, and this requires the dismissal of Counts I and II against him. 
2. There is no evidence that Cook's downloading a resignation form 
letter and sharing it with other employees caused any damage to 
Wesco because ail such damage would have occurred anyway since 
the other employees had already made up their minds about quiting. 
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Tl~e same principles apply to the claims against Mike Cook in Counts I and 11. There is no 
evidence that Cook's drafting a letter of resignation, which was then used by other employees caused 
Wesco any damage. There is no evidence any employee chose to resign because they were given a 
resignation form letter prepared by a co-employee. More importantly, there is no evidence a 
customer lefi or that Wesco lost a single sale because any employee used Cook's resignation form. 
Without this link there is no support for Wesco's losses having been caused by any act of Mike 
Cook. 
Another way to look at this issae is that, legally, as at-will employees, the employees did not 
have to give any notice whatsoever. They could have quit at any time without notice or cause. They 
could legally have simply walked off the job on Friday or simply not shown up on Monday. Such 
conduct may have been rude, but not actionable. The point is, there is no proof that the use of 
Cook's letter caused Wesco any damage. The key employees had already determined to quit before 
they saw Cook's letter and decided to copy it. Ernest and Davis would have opened the P&S stores 
anyway and the customers would have left despite what form of resignation letter was used. Cook 
should be dismissed from Counts I and I1 for lack of proof of damages. R. Vol. 1238-1244. 
C. Count V against Brady Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, Mike Cook; and P&S should be 
dismissed because there is no evidence that Brady, Cook, or Hugh Barkdull caused 
any damage through customer confusion, or that P&S benefittedwrongfullyfrom any 
customer confusion caused by its new employees. 
For this issue the court below found that there was an issue of whether the employees caused 
customer confusion by allegedly wearing P&E clothing after going to work for P&S or by using the 
same personal cell phones they hadused as Wesco employees after going to work for P&S. Judge 
Smith was not presented with the issue of whether such conduct, if it could be proven, caused any 
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losses. The proof of loss on this would be simple - show that a single customer accidentally ordered 
from the wrong store because Brady, Hugh or Mike were using P&E shirts or the same cell phones. 
There is a glaring absence of any proof in the record that even a single customer was confused into 
ordering paint or supplies from the wrong store. Without such evidence CountV must be dismissed 
against all of the remaining Defendants. 
The scant evidence Wesco seems to rely on is a vague claim that someone-not a 
customer-saw a P&S employee wearing a shirt with a Paint & Equipment logo on it, and that 
someone-not a customer-called ace11 phone of a former employee and heard an answering message 
that still saidPaint & Equipment. Within ten days of thenew stores opening, the employees changed 
their cell phone numbers to make sure this was not a problem. The important point though, is that 
not one single customer has ever claimed to have been confused into making an order with the wrong 
company. Wesco has no proof whatsoever that any damages were caused by customer confusion. 
Wesco's suspicion that P&S employees might have done something wrong, or tried to confuse their 
customers is not evidence. There simply is no proof of any damages caused by customer confusion. 
There is no evidence P&S accepted a benefit of any customer confusion, and no evidence that 
Hugh Barkdulli4, Brady, or Cook, did anything to cause confusion. Count V should be dismissed 
entirely at this point for lack of proof of wrongful conduct and a complete lack of proof of any 
damage, based on the law as stated in conjunction with Counts I and 11, above. Thus, P&S should 
be dismissed entirely on summary judgment. 
I4~here is a particular absence of evidence against Hugh Barkdull. It is a mystery to the 
Defendants why Wesco did not dismiss Hugh with the other employee defendants in February 2008. 
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D. Counts VII; VIII and X against Cook should be dismissed because Wesco has no 
evidence ojany losses caused by Cook's deletion of$lesfrom the Wesco computer 
he used. 
Wesco has accused Cook of removing confidential information from its computer for his use 
at P&S, or of depriving Wesco of the benefit of information by deleting it. The accusations are 
contained in Count VII (Computer Fraud Act), Count VIII (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets), and 
Count X (Conversion). Cook denies doing anything harmful to the computer and has testified that 
on the day he resigned he removed his personal files and programs from the computer at work and 
reorganized the files on the computer to make it easier for whoever replaced him to use the 
computer. He admits that his personal file included a list of customers and their phone numbers he 
had created for his own use. R. Vol. I, p. 128 (Cook, par. 5). 
The basis of this renewed motion to dismiss the computer issues focuses on two issues: (A) 
that 18 USCA $ 1030 is inapplicable because the computer was not a "protected computer" under 
the act and (B) all computer related counts should be dismissed because of the lack of evidence of 
any damages caused by Cook's actions. 
1. 18 USCA $ 1030 (Count VII) is not applicable to this computer or to 
the type of allegations made against Cook 
A civil action under 18 USCA 5 1030 "may be brought onJ if the conduct involves one (1) 
of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a)(5) (B)." [Emphasis added]. 
The only section-that could be relevant is (iii), which states: 
(A) Whoever- 
(S)(iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage. 
The key terms in this paragraph are "protected computer" and "damage" both of which are defined 
in tile code. Judge Smith focused on the term "damage" but did not (because no one asked him to) 
focus on the term "protected computer," which is defined: 
(2) The term "protected computer" means a computer-- 
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United 
States Govenunent, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for 
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States 
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use 
by or for the financial institution or the Government; or 
(B) which is used in interstate or foreign colnmerce or 
communication, including a computer located outside the United 
States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce or communication of the United States; 
18 USCA § 1030(e)(2). Obviously Cook's work computer was not owned by afinancial institution 
or by the United States Government. Likewise there is no evidence it was used in interstate 
commerce. This computer was not part of Wesco's conlputer system, nor was it linked to the 
computers at Wesco's home offices. It was used by Cook for local tasks only. Thus, 18 USCA 1030 
does not apply and Count VE should be dismissed. 
2. Counts VII, VIJI and X should be dismissed because there is no 
evidence of any loss or damage caused by Cook's actions as they 
relate to the computer. 
Cook admits deleting certain programs and files from the Wesco computer he used. 
Specifically, in his Affidavit Cook testifies that he did not take customer lists, or any other business 
information, but that he did delete his personal files and some programs he had installed. R. Vol. 
I, p. 128 (Cook Affidavit, par. 5). Cooks deposition supports this. He admits deleting his "work 
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folder" and his programs. R. Vol. VII, p. 1333, (Cook, 21:9-18). He admits this "work folder" 
contained a list of customers and their telephone numbets, a spreadsheet that would calculate a 
percentage of a number (similar to a very simple calculator), and some old letters that had been 
written to customers. That is all the evidence there is. Wesco cannot dispute this. 
The question is, did this deletion of files cause Wesco a loss? It seems apparent that 
customers and phone numbers were readily available through the other computers, which were 
hoolced up to the main Wesco system where all invoices and billing were kept. The point is, Wesco 
has failed anywhere to establish a causal link between having any files deleted by Cook, and any 
damages. Likewise, Cook admits deleting an old letter written to customers. Wesco has failed to 
maice any link between copies of old letters and any ascertainable loss. The truth is that Cook was 
cleaning up his computer, and left it in a condition ready for Wesco's use by whatever employee 
replaced Cook. Nothing he did on that computer caused any harm or loss to Wesco and the computer 
related counts should all be dismissed. There is also no proof that he took any "trade secrets" or used 
them to compete with Wesco. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the remaining counts, and all of the remaining Defendants, should be dismissed from 
this suit in a full and complete summary judgment. 
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